Spillovers can arise when foreign multinational firms (MNEs) train local employees who later join domestic firms, bringing with them part of the technological, marketing and managerial knowledge that they have acquired. Theoretical models by Fosfuri et al (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002) suggest that the direction and the intensity of the mobility of trained workers is affected by market conditions including the degree of product market competition. This, in turn, details an additional channel through which competition is likely to affect total factor productivity. In this paper, we take this hypothesis to the data for the first time by using the Finnish longitudinal employeer-employee data. We first quantify the importance of spillovers via worker mobility by estimating augmented production functions. Second, we estimate several competing risks model to asses the impact of product market competition and absorptive capacity on worker mobility. Our results point out that the lack of competition reduces worker mobility, this in turn negatively affecting the productivity of purely domestic plants. * Very preminary and incomplete. Not to be cited.
Introduction
A striking feature of the globalization in developed countries is that an increasing number of domestic firms have become multinational either through foreign acquisitions or through an expansion of greenfield activities abroad. This development has attracted interest both from researchers and policy-makers. Policy-makers tend to be skeptical towards foreign acquisitions as the "footloose" nature of multinationals is regarded as a threat to domestic jobs and job security. However, multinational firms and inward foreign direct investments are known to have many positive effects. In particular, multinationals tend to have some competitive advantage based on superior technology or other firm-specific knowledge and, therefore, inward FDI is believed to generate knowledge spillovers and productivity improvements which benefit the domestic economy.
The objective of this paper is to analyze whether multinational activity generates positive technology and under which conditions these spillovers occur. As it is well known, spillovers from multinationals may take several forms such as i) backward and forward linkages between foreign-owned and domestic firms, ii) demonstration effects which implies that domestic firms imitate the technology of MNEs and iii) worker mobility as former employees of MNEs join domestic firms and bring with them technological or other firm-specific knowledge (Blomström and Kokko, 1998) . In this paper we focus on this third channel and we provide evidence on its economic importance as well as on whether this specific mechanism of technology diffusion responds to the degree of competition in the product market. Our paper departs from a theoretical formalization of spillovers by Fosfuri et al. (2001) . In the context of a simple but useful two-stage oligopoly model they predict that the degree of competition is likely to play an important role in the occurrence of technology spillovers since the competitive stance in an industry affects differently the incentives multinationals have to keep trained workers as opposed to the incentives domestic firms have to hire them by paying higher wages. In addition, they also show that the absorptive capacity of the local firm affects the potential for FDI generating spillovers.
Our contribution to the scant literature on this issue is twofold. Firstly, we quantify the productivity differential in local plants between workers with multinational experience and workers without such experience (see also Görg and Strobl (2005) and Balsvik (2011) ). This exercise allows us to provide a preliminary test of whether the transmission mechanism we are analyzing is indeed present in our data. Secondly, by estimating a set of multivariate duration models, we are the first to provide rigorous empirical evidence on the impact of product market competition on technology spillovers through worker mobility.
To reach our goals we exploit the availability of employer-employee panel data from Finland (FLEED) for 1990-2006. Our empirical results can be summarized as follow. Firstly, when applying the standard "within-group" methodology adopted in this literature, we find both economically large and statistically significant productivity differentials. Our estimates point out that workers with former multinational experience are 47.7% more productivity than their colleagues without such an experience. Also, our qualitative findings are robust to less restrictive estimation methods which are consistent without assuming strict exogeneity for the inputs in the production function. Secondly, and contrary to the predictions put forward by Fosfuri et al, we find that a more competitive environment seems to be conducive to more technology spillovers.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief critical discussion on both the theoretical and the empirical literature on the specific issue we deal with in our paper. In Section 3 we describe the data sets we use and provide descriptive evidence on differ aspects of worker mobility. Section 4 briefly illustrates our empirical strategy whereas in section 5 we present the econometric results. Section 6 concludes.
Relevant Literature
In their influential survey book on multinational firms, Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) state that the link between the degree of product competition and the extent of technology spillovers from multinationals to domestic firms has "rarely been explored in the literature as it raises complex methodological problems". This turns out to be the case since the entry of multinationals in a given domestic market potentially can bring about both the potential for technology spillovers to local firms and a change in the nature of competition in the industry.
In their view this makes it very difficult to disentangle empirically the two effects on, let's say, the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of local firms.
A potential solution to this problem, which has not been explored so far, is to look directly at the effect of product market competition on observables proxying for technology spillovers more directly, as opposed to more standard output measures such as firm TFP. This approach is supported by a limited number of theoretical papers which provide explicit mechanisms through which product market competition can affect technology transfers from multinationals to local firms. Along this line, Fosfuri et al (2001) develop a simple but very instructive twoperiod oligopoly model. In the first period, a multinational firm provides training to a local worker and gains monopoly profits by using a superior technology. If the multinational keeps the trained worker in the second period, it also keeps gaining monopoly profits. However, in the second period the multinational firm faces competition for the trained worker from a local firm. If the latter is willing to pay a higher salary and therefore to hire the worker, it will enter the market and therefore compete with the multinational firm.
Clearly, the incentive for the latter to keep the worker depends on the toughness of competition in the second period. In particular, technological spillovers are more likely to materialize-and therefore the monopoly ceases to exist-only when the "joint profit" effect does not hold, that is when industry profits are higher if both firms can use the technology. This is more likely to happen when the local and the multinational firm do not compete fiercely in the product market or sell in independent or vertically related markets. Furthermore, their model also predicts that worker mobility, and therefore technology transfer, is more likely to occur when the absorptive capacity of the local firm is sufficiently high and when on-the-job training is general rather than specific. 1 As noted by Fosfuri et al (2001) , however, testing such predictions requires very disaggregated data, which explains why at the time of publication of their paper they claimed, and rightly so, that "this analysis has not been undertaken". 2 In the last decade, however, the increased availability of linked employer-employee datasets has allowed researchers to start opening the black box of technology spillovers and, in particular, to study the relevance of the worker mobility channel much more precisely. In fact, on the one hand, data availability makes it possible to build plant (or firm) specific measures 1 Albeit not directly focussing on the role played by product market competion, Glass and Saggi (2002) also develop a theoretical model along similar lines. Their main conclusions can be summarized as follow. Firstly, the MNE has the incentive to prevent workers' mobility only when technology transfer is incomplete since the required wage premium would be larger -the more complete is technology transfer. Secondly, and possibly more interestingly, the presence of multiple MNEs increases the likelihood of workers' mobility whereas the presence of multiple local firms decreases it. The intuition for this second result is obvious. The incentive to prevent technology transfers is weakened by the presence of multiple MNEs since each of them has the temptation not to offer a wage premium given that all other foreign subsidiaries are doing so. On the other hand, with many local firms competing in the same market, the benefit of restricting technology transfers is large since the MNE can increase the cost of all local competitors by paying the wage premium. 2 A preliminary, albeit informal, attempt to shed some light on this issue is in Smarszinka (2004). By using a firm-level data set from Lithuania, she finds evidence consistent with the presence of positive spillovers taking place only through backward linkages but she does not find evidence of spillovers occurring through either forward and, more importantly, horizontal linkage channel. She rationalizes her finding as follows: "Since multinationals have an incentive to prevent information leakage that would enhance the performance of local competitors, but at the same time may benefit from transferring knowledge to their local suppliers, spillovers from FDI are more likely to be vertical than horizontal in nature". Interestingly she also mentions in the conclusions the need for better data which allow the identification of individual firms as suppliers to multinationals as well as the need to learn more about host country and investor characteristics that determine the extent of spillovers operating through different channels.
for the share of workers in domestic plants with recent experience from multinationals. This measure can then be used in augmented productivity equations as a replacement for the standard, and far less accurate, proxy used in the older literature based on the share of output produced by multinationals operating in the same industry and/or in the same geographical area. On the other hand, and much more importantly for the purpose of this paper, the possibility of following workers over time opens a completely new research dimension since mobility patterns from multinationals to local firms can be modelled in a multivariate duration framework and hypotheses of interest can then be tested in a rigorous way. Gorg and Strobl (2005) is probably the first empirical paper which looks directly at the effect of worker mobility on the performance of domestic firms. Unfortunately, the firm-level data from Ghana they exploit do not provide information on all workers in a firm since they only relate to the entrepreneurs. Still, their overall analysis provides evidence that domestic firms run by entrepreneurs who acquired experience by working for multinationals in the same industry are more productive than other firms. Balsvik (2011) is closer in spirit to our work.
She exploits a fully fledged employer-employee data-set for Norway and is able to provide a number of complementary pieces of empirical evidence which are broadly consistent with the existence of a channel for technology spillovers through worker mobility. In particular she finds a large productivity differential (20%) in local plants between workers with MNE experience compared to their colleagues without such experience, even after controlling for unobserved characteristics of the workers. Coupled with the finding of a 5 percent premium for movers from MNEs to domestic plants, when compared to stayers in local plants with similar characteristics, she concludes that local firms do not fully pay for the value of the workers to the firm and thus worker mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs is found to be a source of knowledge externality in Norwegian manufacturing.
Albeit less directly related to the topic we investigate in this paper, the availability of linked employer-employee data sets has also allowed researchers to investigate the wage policies set up by multinationals in host economies in a more rigorous way. By using detailed panel data for Portugal, Martin (2008) finds that movements from domestic to foreign firms are associated to sensible average pay increases of more than 10 percent. In addition, he also detects a-much smaller in size-selection effect arising from the fact that foreign firms typically hire workers that already enjoy an higher than average wage in their domestic firms. Finally, Pesola (2007) exploits the same Finnish linked employer-employee data set as we use in our paper to analyze the extent to which employees with a multinational background benefit from the knowledge they acquire in foreign-owned firms when moving to domestic firms and, in particular, whether this rent is associated to their educational level. Her main finding suggests that previous tenure in a foreign firm has a positive effect on wages but only for workers located at the top of the distribution of educational levels. In turn, this is consistent with the idea that domestic firms may want to pay higher wages to workers with multinational experience in order to gain access to their knowledge. Tables 1 and 2 present some preliminary features of domestic and foreign ownership in Finland both at firm and plant level. As it can be seen from a close inspection of Table 1 , the vast majority of manufacturing firms with more than 20 employees is domestically owned. This is obviously not to be unexpected since foreign multinationals tend to concentrate in a limited number of industries in which they can exploit their managerial expertise and superior technological skills. For instance, in our first sample year, foreign multinationals account for 12.0 percent of the total number of firms and 15.7 percent of the total number of plants (see Table 1 ). As to domestically owned firms, those with some multinational activity account for an additional 18.2 percent and 32.9 percent of total firms and plants respectively. Despite the short time dimension of our panel, this initial picture changes substantially over the years since both foreign and domestic multinationals experience a much stronger growth rate in 3 Register information whether the firm is multinational is available from 1997 which restrict the period of analysis to 1997-2004. the number of firms (33.5 percent and 44.6 percent respectively) and plants (14.5 percent and 46.8 percent respectively) compared to their domestic non-multinational counterparts (20.5 percent and 7.4 percent respectively).
Descriptive Statistics
[ Table 1 and 2 here] As unanimously found in the literature, multinational firms, both foreign and domestic, appear to run much larger plants (from four to six times) than purely local firms in terms of both turnover and value added (see Table 2 ). When computed as a share of turnover, foreign multinationals are also found to use labor-as proxied by the wage bill-less intensively than domestic firms, regardless of their multinational status. As to capital-as proxied by fixed capital computed by using the perpetual inventory methodology-the overall picture is less clear-cut. Still, when focusing on the median, foreign firms are found to use capital less intensively than domestic firms especially if we confine the comparison to those with some multinational activities. Furthermore, foreign multinationals invest in R&D more than purely domestic local firms but less than domestic multinational firms. This is not surprising, since multinational firms tend to concentrate the bulk of their R&D activities in their home country. Finally, our data do not suggest any striking difference in the mean or median accounting price-cost margins among the three group of firms. This turns out to be the case since the lower wage shares which characterize both domestic and foreign multinationals are counterbalanced by proportionally similar higher shares of consumption of intermediate inputs, as documented by the value added to turnover ratio.
[ Tables 3 and 4 here] Table 3 displays statistics quantifying employees entering domestic firms, domestic MNEs and foreign MNEs in the sample. We distinguish all entrants including entrants from previous years as early as the data set allows (since 1990) and new entrants in the current year. It may be noticed that the share of all entrants increases over the period, suggesting that worker mobility increases during the period. For instance, the share of all entrants increases from 15.5% to 21.9% in foreign firms between 1997 and 2004. Similar pattern, although not as monotonous may be observed for the share of new entrants. In our productivity estimations we include a share of entrants from previous years, but in the mobility estimations we focus on the worker exit mobility in current year. Table 4 displays worker characteristics of the entrants in different type of firms at the entry year. The MNEs, both foreign and domestic, employ a larger share of female workers, workers with longer education and longer previous tenure than domestic non-MNEs.
[ Tables 5a and 5b here] In Tables 5a and 5b , we display statistics quantifying the entrants to domestic firms and the separators from foreign firms, respectively. We focus on these statistics since our primary interest is to analyse whether worker mobility from MNEs to domestic firms generate productivity spillovers in the domestic firms. Most entrants seem to come from other domestic firms. For most years the share of entrants from foreign firms is the smallest, but once again, it is increasing over the time period. These differences may reflect the ownership structure of the firms operating in Finland. The share of foreign firms is smaller than the share of domestic firms and domestic MNEs. However, the share of foreign owned firms is increasing, and consequently, the pool of workers with experience from foreign firms is increasing. Thus, the scope for positive productivity spillovers may be increasing as well. In the following sections, we first aim to establish whether worker mobility generates productivity spillovers and then we analyse factors affecting worker mobility.
Our empirical strategy consists of two complementary sets of econometric estimates. Firstly, we estimate an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function with firm-level data. This first step serves two different purposes. On the one hand, it allows us to establish whether worker mobility from multinationals to local firms has a positive effect on the total factor productivity of local firms. This is obviously of paramount importance given the purpose of this paper.
Indeed, finding no effect in our data would make the analysis of the effect of competition and absorptive capacity on worker mobility far less interesting simply because the transmission channel going from competition to productivity via worker mobility would not be there.
On the other hand, the estimation of production functions allows us to recover firm level measures of the technological distance of local firms from their multinational counterparts, this in turn being a proxy for absorptive capacity. In the second step, we apply the competing risks framework to the analysis of the effect of product market competition and absorptive capacity on worker mobiliy from multinationals to local firms. This general transition model accomodates situations like ours that involve more than one destination and can be therefore interpreted as a multivariate duration model involving the joint specification and estimation of two or more hazard functions. 4 
Productivity Equations
We start from the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
where Y it , M it , K it and L * it denote respectively production, consumption of materials and services, capital stock and quality adjusted labor of firm i at time t. Quality adjusted labor is equal to
where L M it and L N it denote labor with MNE experience and labor without such experience,
and s it is the share of total labour, L it with MNE experience. In this context, the unknown parameter, γ can be interpreted as a positive productivity premium (Balsvik, 2011 ) generated by the technology spillover embodied in L M it . The productivity term A it is modelled as follows:
where δ t is a time specific intercept, η i is the individual effect which in the present context can be thought of as unobserved firm characteristics that can be viewed as constant over the sample period, and u it is the serially uncorrelated idiosyncratic error. 5 By using equations (1), (2) and (3), by taking logs and by using the approximation
equation (1) can be rewritten in the following representation:
where y it , m it , l it , and k it are the logarithms of
To recover consistent estimates of the expected effect on productivity of the share of labor with MNE experience, s it , holding all other variables fixed, reasonable identification assumptions have to be made. In particular, it seems sensible to assume that both standard input factors (m it , l it , k it ) and the labor share (s it ) are correlated with the individual effect (η i ). This allows for the possibility that firm heterogeneity-if observable to managers even if not to the econometrician-matter in hiring decisions of workers with MNE experience. To take this endogeneity problem into account, we estimate equation (4) by using the standard within group transformation. This approach does not put any restriction on the conditional distribution of η i with respect to all past, present and future input levels. It requires however that all inputs are strictly exogenous with respect to the idiosyncratic component, u it thus ruling out the possibility that managers adjust their input levels after observing past or present idiosyncratic productivity shocks. 6 Although within-group estimation of equation (4) controls for unobserved heterogeneity, the share of employees with MNE experience-as well as other input factors-are unlikely to be orthogonal to present and past idiosyncratic shocks. In order to obtain consistent estimates of the impact of labour mobility on productivity, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, inputs' simultaneity and measurement errors, we rely on the GMM-system technique developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . 7 This approach has become common in the empirical literature measuring productivity of MNEs and has been used by we therefore contribute to this strand of literature by allowing for the share of workers with MNE experience to be sequentially exogenous as opposed to strictly exogenous.
Operationally, the idiosyncratic error u it in equation (3) is redefined as the sum of a first 6 Note that this is the benchmark identification strategy adopted in Balsvik (2011). 7 GMM estimators have been found to produce large finite-sample biases when using the standard firstdifferenced estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) in the context of the estimation of production functions. These biases can be dramatically reduced by exploiting reasonable stationarity restrictions on the initial conditions process. See, for instance, and .
order autoregressive productivity shock, v it , and a serially uncorrelated measurement error, ε it :
where
and e it , ε it ∼ MA(0)
By using (3), (5) and (6) equation (1) can be rewritten in the following dynamic presentation:
Finally, equation (8) is equal to:
We test whether these restrictions are rejected and choose the model accordingly. If the restrictions are not rejected we estimate the structural parameters by using minimum distance estimation techniques, and if they are rejected we estimate long-term effects treating equation (12) as an unrestricted autoregressive-distributed lag model.
Mobility Equations
A worker operating in a multinational firm faces J distinct potential causes of transition. In the survival analysis literature, they are commonly labeled as risk factors. Albeit the focus of this paper is on the role played by product market competition on the mobility from a multinational to a local firm, it has to be taken into account that any "real world" situation involving two or more destination states or risks should be regarded as a multivariate model because the analysis involves the joint distribution of more than one duration. This makes it possible to relax the assumption that the hazard function does not depend on the destination state and to consider instead a less restrictive formulation in which-possibly independent-"competing risks" determine the worker tenure lenght in the multinational firm. More importantly for our purposes, it also avoids the risk of misinterpreting the estimated parameters of each estimated hazard function which conveys no information on the effect of a change in a given covariate on the likelihood of exit via option j since the sign of this effect also depends on the sign and size of all other sub-hazards.
To understand this important point, let g j (t) be the probability of leaving the initial state to option j in the interval (t, t + dt). Furthermore, let λ(t) be the overall hazard function, then
If risks are independent the expression in (14) simplifies further to
where λ j (t) is the sub-hazard function for risk j. 8 We can therefore write the overall survival function as
What we are interested in this paper is to assess the impact of a change in a given covariate on the probability of leaving the initial state via risk j. To achieve this objective let define f j (t)
as the density function of leaving the initial state at timet via risk j and P j the probability of leaving the initial state via risk j. It follows that
Finally, if we integrate both sides over the range of s we obtain that
where P j is simply the unconditional probability of leaving the initial state via risk j. As it is apparent from the expression in (18) this probability is a function of the parameters in all J risks trough the overall survival function, S and not only of λ j . Thomas (1996) derives the general expression for the partial derivative of P j with respect to x j and shows that its sign is also a function of the parameters of all the hazards. Furthermore, he points out that obtaining the implied marginal effects can be computationally demanding even for simple parametric models. To circumvent this problem he suggests to focus instead on the conditional probability of leaving the initial state via risk j at time t, P j (t), where
As it can be easily seen this variable also depends on all sub-hazard functions. If all of them are of the proportional hazard form
it can be proved that the sgn(∂P j (t)/∂x j ) is positive if β ji > 0 and β ji > β ki ∀k 6 = j. 9 The main aim of our analysis is to test the relevance of the two main hypothesis derived from the model of Fosfuri et al (2001) . In particular, technological spillovers are more likely to materialize when the local and the multinational firm do not compete fiercely in the product market or sell in independent or vertically related markets. Among the covariates we include measures of competition, price-cost margins (pcm) and Herfindahl index (hf ), to test whether the incentive for the multinational to keep the worker depends on the toughness of competition. Their model also predicts that worker mobility, and therefore technology transfer, is more likely to occur when the absorptive capacity of the local firm is sufficiently high.
To capture this we compute a firm-specific productivity gap between the multinational and non-multinational firms (prod_gap). The productivity gap measures are based on our productivity estimations commente upon in section 6.1. Thus, the main goal is to determine whether 9 The same argument also applies to the unconditional marginal effect if one is willing to restrict all the baseline hazard parameters to be equal. pcm, hf and prod_gap influence the probability of moving to a domestic firm, controlling for the other individual-and firm-specific covariates. As controlling covariates we include age, gender, marital and parenthood status, education level, income and location.
Econometric Results

Productivity Equations
Table (6) reports productivity equations for the sample of domestic non-multinational firms and the sample of multinational firms, including both foreign and domestically owned. In addition to the standard input variables (materials, labor and capital) each equation includes several additional regressors, which represent the share of workers who have previously worked in a multinational (s MNE, s domestic MN E and s foreign MNE, respectively) and the share of other workers previously worked in other type of firms (s non-MNE, s non-domestic MN E and s non-foreign MNE, respectively). We believe that gaining experience that may become useful for the another firm takes some time, and include workers with a previous tenure of at least 3 years in the shares. Obviously, we are mostly interested in the sign and size of γ mne , γ dmne and γ fmne as estimated on the sample of non-multinational firms since this is technology transmission channel we are focusing on. Indeed, two of these three coefficients turn out to be positive and statistically significant, γ mne and γ fmne . Since the coefficient for the share of workers with experience from domestic multinationals γ dmne is not significant, the effect of workers with experience from multinationals seems to be driven by the workers previously working in foreign multinationals. Furthermore, the magnitude of γ fmne is economically sizeable since it implies a productivity premium as large as 0.553. This means that workers hired from foreign MNEs contribute on average 55.3% more to the productivity of the plant than the incumbent workers.
[ Table 6 here] However, in order for our identification approach to be convincing we also have to show that the productivity premium we estimate is peculiar to the type of worker mobility we are focusing on, that is the transitions from (foreign) multinationals to domestic non-multinational firms. The first alternative explanation we have to rule out is therefore the possibility that what matters for the productivity of domestic non-multinational firms is simply the hiring of new employees, regardless of the characteristics of their previous work place. This might be the case, for instance, because new hires have better skills or are likely to put more effort in order to get tenure or, more simply, to reveal their unknown ability type. This alternative hypothesis can be tested by looking at the parameters γ non−MNE and γ non−foreignMNE as estimated in the sample of domestic non-multinational firms. It turns out that the estimated parameters are much smaller in size (0.027 and 0.033, respectively) and not different from zero at conventional statistical levels. Taken at its face value, these overall findings corroborate the hypothesis that technology spillovers though worker mobility is associated to transitions from foreign multinationals to domestic non-multinational firms.
The basic assumption of our approach so far has been that the direction of spillovers through worker mobility is from (foreign) multinationals to non-multinationals, and consequently that spillovers are not relevant in the opposite direction. This has not to be necessarily be the case, however, because, for instance, foreign and domestic firms might have complementary comparative advantages. If this is the case, foreign multinational could benefit from hiring workers with a more pronounced local background. If this is the case γ non−MNE and γ non−foreignMNE should enter with a positive sign in the equation estimated on the sample of multinational firms. This conjecture, however, is not supported by the data since these estimated parameters are not statistically different from zero, albeit γ non−MNE and γ non−foreignMNE are positively signed (0.169 and 0.074).
All the results reported so far are based on the crucial assumption that inputs can be treated as strictly exogenous. This in turn rules out the possibility that firm managers may adjust input levels-including the share of workers with previous MNE experience-after observing present or past productivity shocks. In order to address this legitimate concern and to test-at least qualitatively-for the robustness of our previous findings to violations of the strict exogeneity assumption, we also report the GMM-system estimations of the dynamic model specified by equation (13) Table (7) shows the results for the model using earlier instruments dated t-2 for the equations in first differences and instruments dated t-1 for the equations in level. In both columns the test statistics indicate, as expected, that there is evidence of first but not of second order serial correlation. As for the Sargan-Hansen test, the validity of the instrument set is not rejected at the 1% significance level in both equations. However, the common factor restrictions implied by the theory are rejected in the equation estimated on the sample of nonmultinational firms (column (i)). This in turn implies that we cannot impose these restrictions to our data and consequently we cannot recover the implied structural parameters. Nevertheless, we can still interpret our estimated model as an unrestricted autoregressive-distributed lag structure and compute the corresponding long-run effects. Rather comfortingly, only the effect on the s foreign variable in the sample of non-multinational firms turns out to be positive and significant at conventional statistical levels (0.838 with an associated standard error of 0.196). Needless to say, this additional finding is fully consistent with our previous results obtained with more restrictive estimation methods.
Mobility Equations
In assessing the effect of product market competition and absorptive capacity on worker mobility from foreign multinationals to purely domestic firms, we first identify those workers who are employed in a foreign multinational in 1997-that is our first sample year-and we trace them over the entire sample period. In the first set of equations (Table 8) In order to test the predictions of Fosfuri et al (2001), we compute the time varying twodigit price-cost margin (PCM) and Herfindahl index (HF) of the foreign firm a given worker is employed by as proxies of the competitive environment. As proxy for absorptive capacity, we use the productivity gap between the same foreign firm and the average domestic non-MNE firm in the same two-digit industry. We apply two measures of productivity gap, based respectively on WG (see Table 6 ) and GMM-system production function estimations (see Table 7 ). The number of observations is reduced in the latter by the use of lagged variables in productivity estimations. Predictions from received theory suggest that PCM and HF should enter with a positive sign and productivity gap with a negative sign in the purely domestic destination state sub-hazard function. In all regressions, we also include several standard individual level variables: age, gender, marital and parenthood status, educational level, income and location. Finally, this baseline model is augmented with a set of categorical variables proxying for foreign MNE size and with a set of aggregate time dummies capturing aggregate business cycle effects. Table 8 only partly confirm received theoretical predictions. In the sub-hazard function for the purely domestic firm destination state, the coefficient on the productivity gap is indeed negative and statistically significant in all columns ((i)-(iv) ). This result is therefore robust to both WG (columns (i) and (ii)) and GMM-system (columns (iii) and (iv)) based productivity gap measures. The only difference is that the coefficient on GMM-system based productivity gap measures is larger. However, the sign on the PCM variable is also negative and statistically significant in all columns and thus not consistent with theoretical predictions. When included, the Herfindahl index has a positive, although insignificant, sign.
Results in
The estimated parameters on age, gender, number of small children and income are negative in all columns, implying that all these variables slow down the transition to purely domestic firms. On the other hand, the educational level and the Helsinki location, both enter with a positive sign. This in turn suggests that the increase in these two variables accelerates the transition to purely domestic firms.
As explained in section 4.2, the sign of the impact of a covariate on the probability of leaving the initial state via mobility to a purely domestic firm is not given by the sign on the same covariate in the purely domestic firm destination state sub-hazard function. For this reason, we also report (column (v)-(viii)) the sub-hazard functions for the multinational destination state. As it can be easily seen, the estimated parameters on PCM are never statistically different from zero, whereas the estimated parameters on the productivity gap are not statistically different from zero in the equations based on WG estimates (columns (v) and (vi)). They are negative, statistically significant, but smaller in size-compared to the alternative destination state-in the equations based on GMM-system estimation (columns (vi) and (vii)). These additional findings show therefore that the absorptive capacity of purely domestic firms in an industry not only increases the independent sub-hazard ratio for the purely domestic firm destination but also the probability of leaving the initial state via this destination state. Analogously, more competition (that is a lower PCM) increases both the independent sub-hazard ratio and the probability of moving to a purely domestic firm. The prediction that worker mobility, and therefore technology transfer, is more likely to occur when the local and the multinational firm do not compete fiercely in the product market, does not seem to be supported by our results. On the contrary, the more competitive the industry where the foreign firm operates the more likely are the workers to move. However, our results are consistent with the other prediction, that worker mobility is more likely when the absorptive capacity of the local firm is sufficiently high.
[ Table 8 here]
In the second set of estimates, we further distinguish between destination to a domestic firm operating in the same two-digit industry and to a domestic firm operating in a different two-digit industry. In this way we aim to capture whether the effect of competition and absorptive capacity on worker mobility differ when the destination firm is competing in the same as opposed to a different two-digit industry. Indeed, Fosfuri et al (2001) predict that technological spillovers are more likely to materialize when the local and the multinational firm do not compete fiercely in the same product market or sell in independent or vertically related markets. Thus, the degree of competition-as measured by the industry level price cost margin-should indeed have a greater effect on worker mobility in the same industry.
[ Table 9 here]
The results for inter-industry mobility are displayed in columns (i)-(iv) and for intraindustry in columns (v)-(viii) in Table 9 . Once again, the results concerning competition go against the theoretical predictions. Competition measured by price-cost margin does not have any significant effect on worker mobility within the same industry. However, the sign on the price-cost margin variable is negative and statistically significant in the inter-industry estimations. The latter suggest that workers are less likely to move to other industries if they are employed in a industry with high price-cost margins. On the other hand, our other competition measure, Herfindahl index, suggests that workers are more likely to move to other industries from more concentrated and less competitive industries. The latter does not, however, apply to intra-industry mobility where we would expect larger impact of level of competition on mobility. Results concerning absorptive capacity are more intuitive in the sense that technological distance deters intra-industry mobility more than inter-industry mobility. F irm -year clu stered stan d ard errors (p rob ab ility levels) in rou n d (squ are) b rackets.
